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Conclusion .........................................................................................1283 
INTRODUCTION 
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance.  But our Constitution says we 
must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of 
hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans 
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often 
disputatious, society.1 
 
The interplay between student freedom of speech and school 
maintenance of authority is a recurring issue in American high 
schools.  The messages that students seek to convey to one another 
through clothing range from frivolous to serious, from crude to 
sophisticated, from mundane to controversial.2  While many students 
make their clothing choices with an eye on fashion, popularity, or 
fitting in, others seek to convey a message about religious, political, 
or moral issues of importance to them.  Student expression 
sometimes touches upon controversial issues such as American 
involvement in war, support for the president, religion, politics, 
abortion, marriage, homosexuality, and immigration reform.3 
Students whose clothing deals with controversial topics may want to 
spark conversations, change other students’ minds, or simply express 
their opinions to their peers.  Often, however, any actual or potential 
controversy that may arise between students over the content of a 
controversial shirt, armband, or other clothing is overshadowed by a 
conflict that develops between the speaker and school officials who 
punish the student for wearing the expressive item or prohibit him or 
her from wearing it in the future.4  At that point, the student’s 
insistence on a right to continue to wear the expressive clothing tests 
                                                          
 1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) 
(citation omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269 (1988) 
(holding that a principal had the authority to prohibit students from publishing an 
article about teen pregnancy in the school’s newspaper). 
 3. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (stating that several students wore black 
armbands to their school to protest the Vietnam War). 
 4. See id. at 505 (noting that several students were suspended from school for 
wearing armbands as a form of protest and were not permitted to come back to 
school until they returned without the armbands). 
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the limits upon the school’s authority to control the educational 
environment.5 
As numerous federal court cases make clear, sometimes school 
districts overstep their bounds and violate students’ right to freedom 
of speech, while other times their actions are legally permissible.6  
While some well-established principles have emerged over the course 
of decades of litigation, the case-by-case nature of the legal standards 
involved can make it difficult to predict how courts will apply existing 
precedent to any particular set of facts.  It is clear, however, that some 
courts have sought to preserve the greatest extent of student freedom 
of speech possible while others have given educators much greater 
leeway to restrict controversial student speech.7 
This Article argues for broad First Amendment protection for 
“controversial” religious and pro-life student expression.  The vast 
majority of religious and pro-life clothing is no more likely to create 
an actual disturbance that substantially disrupts school functions than 
a peace armband worn during Vietnam, the student expression 
upheld in the seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.8  Section I of this Article discusses several 
Supreme Court student speech cases with an emphasis on their 
applicability to situations involving high school students who wear 
“controversial” religious and pro-life clothing.  This section argues 
that Tinker’s substantial disruption test—not Tinker’s “rights of others” 
dicta or Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser9—provides the 
appropriate mode of analysis for cases involving “controversial” 
religious and pro-life clothing. 
Section II reviews several lower court cases that have considered 
restrictions on student religious or pro-life speech.  This section 
                                                          
 5. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (explaining 
that schools teach students how to behave in a mature and civil manner). 
 6. Compare Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975 
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that a student’s First Amendment rights were violated 
when school administrators told him to leave school for wearing a religious t-shirt), 
with Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007) (holding that school administrators had 
the authority to suspend a student for wearing a religious t-shirt that condemned 
homosexuality). 
 7. See infra Part II.A–B (comparing cases where courts have protected the 
student’s right to self-expression to cases where the courts emphasized the need for 
the school to maintain an orderly learning environment).   
 8. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 740 (reversing the lower court and permitting students 
to wear armbands illustrating their disagreement with the Vietnam War because the 
armbands did not create a substantial disturbance in the classroom). 
 9. For a discussion of Bethel, one of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases, 
see infra Section I.C. 
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argues that Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education,10 
K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District,11 and Saxe ex rel. Saxe 
v. State College Area School District12 present a proper reading of Tinker 
by providing broad protection for controversial student speech.  
Conversely, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District13 and 
Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District14 provide insufficient 
protection for student religious and pro-life expression.  The Article 
concludes by encouraging lower courts to follow the reasoning of the 
more speech-protective cases whenever possible. 
It is important to note that, while this article focuses on religious 
and pro-life student expression that might be considered to be 
“controversial,” all religious and pro-life speech may be characterized 
as controversial in some sense.  Religious speech often touches upon 
one’s most fundamental understanding of the universe and human 
existence, and one’s moral, social, and political worldview.  Religious 
speakers often encourage those who hear or read their messages to 
reconsider their religious beliefs, reexamine their understanding of 
right and wrong, or take, or refrain from taking, certain actions.15 
Similarly, speakers who oppose abortion often express their strong 
disagreement with abortion in stark terms and urge others to 
reconsider their beliefs about the morality of abortion.  If schools are 
permitted to use a heavy hand in restricting student expression that, 
in the school’s view, “attacks” other students’ belief systems (by 
challenging them to reconsider their views) or speech that may 
offend some students or make them feel uncomfortable, a vast 
expanse of student religious and pro-life expression will be subject to 
censorship. 
I. SUPREME COURT CASES GOVERNING STUDENT SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has on several occasions considered the 
interplay between the authority of public schools to govern student 
conduct and the right of students to convey (or refuse to convey) a 
message.  This Section reviews five key cases with an emphasis on 
their relevance for cases involving religious, pro-life, and pro-
traditional marriage t-shirts. 
                                                          
 10. 383 F. Supp. 2d at 965. 
 11. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005). 
 12. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 13. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 14. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
 15. See, e.g., K.D., 2005 WL 2175166, at *1–3 (describing the case of a student 
who wore a shirt to school that criticized abortion and alluded to the value of life). 
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A. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,16 the Court held 
that a public school could not compel students to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance over their religious objections.17  Although subject to 
expulsion from school, some students refused to recite the Pledge 
because doing so would violate their religious beliefs.18 
While acknowledging that “the State may ‘require teaching by 
instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and 
organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil 
liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country,’”19 the 
Court noted, “[h]ere, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of 
students to declare a belief.  They are not merely made acquainted 
with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what it is or 
even what it means.”20  Although the educational functions of school 
officials are important, the Court declared that there were “none that 
they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.”21 
The Court added: 
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much.  That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order. 
 If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.22 
While Barnette has been treated primarily as a “compelled speech” 
case, it has continued relevance in the context of controversial 
student speech.  Barnette stands for the principle that school officials 
may not trample upon students’ right to freedom of speech in their 
eagerness to promote an ideal such as patriotism, love of country, or, 
in the current setting, tolerance of other students’ beliefs and 
actions.23 
                                                          
 16. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 17. Id. at 642.  The Court noted that the First Amendment protects dissenters 
from being coerced by governmental officials.  Id.  
 18. Id. at 629. 
 19. Id. at 631 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 637. 
 22. Id. at 642. 
 23. See id. at 644 (explaining that the toleration of conflicting viewpoints is 
essentially a benchmark of democracy).  
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B. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
Tinker stands as the pinnacle of student speech rights.24  In Tinker, a 
group of junior high school and senior high school students decided 
to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War and 
publicize their support for a truce.25  When school officials learned of 
the students’ proposed activities, they enacted a policy prohibiting 
students from wearing armbands during school.26  Nevertheless, the 
students wore their black armbands and were suspended.27 
The Supreme Court declared that “the wearing of armbands in the 
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or 
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it”28 and “was 
closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is 
entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”29  
The Court noted that “First Amendment rights, applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students,”30 and declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”31 
In particular, public schools may not stifle student speech simply 
because it expresses a viewpoint that differs from the school’s 
viewpoint on controversial issues: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism. . . .  In our system, students may not be regarded as 
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate. . . .  In the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are 
entitled to freedom of expression of their views.32 
The Court elaborated on the scope of student speech rights, 
stating:  
A student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours.  
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the 
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, 
                                                          
 24. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM?  Scrutinizing Public School 
Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1206, 1211–14 (2008) (discussing how later cases such as Fraser, Hazelwood and 
Morse limit student speech beyond the broad rule espoused in Tinker that greatly 
protected students’ First Amendment rights).  
 25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 505. 
 29. Id. at 505–06. 
 30. Id. at 506. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 511. 
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even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he 
does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.33 
The Court held that the school violated the students’ right to 
freedom of speech by prohibiting them from wearing armbands, 
stating that there was no evidence “that the school authorities had 
reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon 
the rights of other students.”34  Regarding the non-disruptive nature 
of the students’ expression, the Court noted: 
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a 
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any 
disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners.  There is here 
no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or 
nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of 
other students to be secure and to be let alone.  Accordingly, this 
case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the 
work of the schools or the rights of other students.35 
While speech restrictions enacted by public school officials must be 
based on more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,”36 the 
school’s actions in this case “appear[] to have been based upon an 
urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the 
expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to 
this Nation’s part in the conflagration in Vietnam.”37  The broad 
scope of the Tinker Court’s protection of controversial student “pure 
speech” cannot be understated.38  
Justice Black stated in his dissenting opinion that “students, like 
other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black 
armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call 
attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded 
and the dead being their friends and neighbors.”39  Moreover, Justice 
Black observed: 
[The students’] armbands caused comments, warnings by other 
students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 34. Id. at 509. 
 35. Id. at 508. 
 36. Id. at 509. 
 37. Id. at 510. 
 38. See id. at 505–06 (noting that “pure speech” is entitled to significant 
protection under the First Amendment). 
 39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black., J., dissenting). 
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football player that other, nonprotesting students had better let 
them alone. . . . [A] teacher of mathematics had his lesson period 
practically “wrecked” chiefly by disputes with Mary Beth Tinker, 
who wore her armband for her “demonstration.”40 
Despite these facts, however, the majority opinion explained that a 
school cannot censor student expression simply because it may foster 
debate or trigger arguments among students.  The Court observed 
that, “in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”41 
Since Tinker was decided, many commentators have debated 
whether the decision (and subsequent cases interpreting and 
applying it) struck the proper balance between the interests of 
schools and the speech rights of students.42  Some have argued that 
the courts have given too little weight to the arguments of school 
administrators.  One author has declared that “[w]ith every decision 
upholding students’ right to free expression in public schools, the 
federal courts of this country weaken the structural integrity of the 
foundation that is our system of public education.”43  Another 
commentator has argued that Tinker’s material disruption standard 
should be lessened to allow schools to regulate speech that merely 
distracts other students “for the sake of better promoting the school’s 
varied basic missions and purposes.”44 
On the other hand, some have defended Tinker and argued for the 
greatest protection of student expression possible.  One author has 
stated that “[c]ountless rationales are given as to why student’s free 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 517–18. 
 41. Id. at 508 (majority opinion). 
 42. This debate has not been confined solely to Tinker but has engulfed its 
progeny as well.  See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text (discussing how 
Morse has further blurred the line between the authority of the school and the 
constitutional freedoms of its students). 
 43. Michael C. Jacobson, Note, Chaos in Public Schools:  Federal Courts Yield to 
Students While Administrators and Teachers Struggle To Control the Increasingly Violent and 
Disorderly Scholastic Environment, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 909, 909 (2006).  
This author posits that 
[w]here the potential exists (for any student who has not reached the age of 
majority) for the school’s educational mission to be disrupted by political or 
religious rhetoric, the value of a pure education—the ability to formulate one’s 
own opinion, rather than have the opinion of another student forced upon 
them—must substantially outweigh the value of unfettered First Amendment 
rights of students who the Supreme Court has classified as “unemancipated.” 
Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
 44. R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights:  A Functionalist 
Alternative, 41 IND. L. REV. 105, 109 (2008); see also id. (“Individual public schools 
should be permitted reasonable experimental latitude in fairly regulating student 
speech that causes distraction in order to better discharge the school’s overall 
educational and community responsibilities.”). 
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speech rights should be limited, but none are persuasive.  Rather, 
school students should be given the opportunity to exercise 
constitutional rights to better prepare them for adulthood.”45  
Another commentator has declared that Tinker is based on the idea 
that “[a]chieving free expression requires an open marketplace in 
which citizens are susceptible to varied viewpoints.  Moreover, schools 
are parts of that marketplace, with students entitled to the privileges 
of citizenry.”46  In addition, 
[o]ne corollary of intolerance and the silencing of dissent is 
conformity.  Individuals who choose to be nonconformist are 
sometimes viewed as problematic by authorities.  Those authorities 
who suppress disagreement often do so to achieve uniform 
allegiance to—and acceptance of—their belief systems.47 
Unpopular or controversial student speech is deserving of broad 
protection precisely because it is likely to prompt discussion and 
debate among students.  One author has noted that “[p]olitical, 
religious, literary, intellectual, and artistic expression can contribute 
to the development of children’s moral powers, so expression in 
these categories merits special protection.”48  While expression in 
these categories may cause some students to reconsider their own 
beliefs and behaviors, that is no reason to censor student speech.  
The Supreme Court’s more recent student speech cases have served 
to fuel, rather than end, debate over Tinker. 
C. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser49 presented the Court with its 
first opportunity to apply Tinker to a student free speech case.50  In 
Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech nominating a fellow 
student for student government at a school-sponsored assembly.51  
Students were required to attend either the assembly or a study hall.52  
                                                          
 45. Brandon James Hoover, An Analysis of the Applicability of First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech Protections to Students in Public Schools, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 39, 62 
(2008). 
 46. Joseph Russomanno, Dissent Yesterday and Today:  The Tinker Case and Its 
Legacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 367, 375–76 (2006). 
 47. Id. at 382; see also William Galston, When Well-Being Trumps Liberty:  Political 
Theory, Jurisprudence, and Children’s Rights, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279, 280 (2004) 
(“[W]e are not free simply to balance speech, or religious free exercise, against 
considerations of social utility.”). 
 48. Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for Children, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55, 79 (2004). 
 49. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 50. After Tinker was decided in 1969, the Supreme Court did not decide another 
student speech case until Fraser in 1986.  
 51. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677. 
 52. Id.  
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About 600 students attended the assembly, many of whom were 
fourteen years old.53  The speech at issue was filled with sexual 
innuendo.54  “During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, . . . . [s]ome 
students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated 
the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in [his] speech.”55  The 
student was suspended for violating the school’s policy prohibiting 
obscene language.56 
The Fraser Court held that the school “acted entirely within its 
permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response 
to his offensively lewd and indecent speech.”57  The Court noted that 
“the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political 
viewpoint.”58 Moreover, 
[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as 
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.  A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a 
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting 
audience of teenage students.59  
The Court explained “[t]he marked distinction between the 
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content 
of respondent’s speech in this case”60 and observed that it had 
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of protecting children from 
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, vulgar, lewd, and offensive 
speech.61  As such, “‘the First Amendment gives a high school student 
the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s 
jacket.’”62  
                                                          
 53. Id. 
 54. For portions of the speech, see Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion.  Id. at 
687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 685. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 680. 
 61. Id. at 684; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (holding 
that the obscene content of a radio broadcast could be regulated, due to the fact that 
children may be listening); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638–39 (1968) 
(ruling that the State has the right to limit people from selling sexually explicit 
material to minors). 
 62. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).  In Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court invalidated the conviction of a Vietnam War 
protester for breaching the peace by wearing a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft” in a 
courthouse corridor.  Id. at 26. 
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In addition, the Court found the role of public schools as 
institutions that “inculcate the habits and manners of civility”63 and 
“prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse”64 
to be significant, noting that “[e]ven the most heated political 
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the 
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.”65  The 
Court noted Congress’s longstanding practice of prohibiting the use 
of indecent, abusive, or offensive language during floor debates and 
asked, “[c]an it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is 
beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?”66  The Court 
declared that: 
[t]hese fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” 
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance 
of divergent political and religious views, even when the views 
expressed may be unpopular.  But these “fundamental values” must 
also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, 
and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.67 
The Court held that “[t]he pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s 
speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students—indeed to 
any mature person.”68 
Lower courts have struggled to interpret Fraser in cases that do not 
involve sexual innuendo.69  As a general matter, “Fraser is commonly 
read to treat speech that is lewd or offensive in its manner of 
expression as low-value speech in the schools even though such 
speech enjoys more protection elsewhere.”70  However, a “broad 
reading of Fraser [would] allow[] a school to restrict any speech that 
                                                          
 63. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 64. Id. at 683. 
 65. Id. at 681. 
 66. Id. at 682. 
 67. Id. at 681; see also id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he State has 
interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public 
discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities.”). 
 68. Id. at 683 (majority opinion).  In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260 (1988), the Court observed that “[t]he decision in Fraser rested on the 
‘vulgar,’ ‘lewd,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ character of a speech delivered at an official 
school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to ‘materially disrup[t] 
classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’”  Id. at 
271–72 n.4 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969)). 
 69. Compare Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540–
42 (6th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Fraser to apply only to lewd and indecent speech, not 
speech involving an objectionable viewpoint such as a Confederate flag), with Boroff 
v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Fraser 
to apply to plainly offensive language as well as vulgar language). 
 70. John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 
228 n.18 (2007). 
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is inconsistent with the school’s educational mission or conflicts with 
the fundamental values of public school education.”71 
As one author has explained, this view undermines Tinker “by 
allowing a school to define whatever mission it sees fit and then argue 
that whatever speech disagrees with or undermines that mission is 
offensive.”72  To prevent Fraser from having the effect of eviscerating 
Tinker, the author has argued that plainly offensive speech that 
schools may prohibit “should include speech that may not necessarily 
rise to the level of obscenity or indecency, but that nonetheless 
‘causes a break in the learning process.’ . . . [T]he school must show 
not only that the speech was somehow inappropriate for school but 
also that it caused some disruption of school functioning.”73 Properly 
interpreted, Fraser should have little, if any, bearing in cases involving 
student religious or pro-life clothing because such expression does 
not entail the kind of lewd or sexually explicit speech that Fraser 
allows schools to restrict.74  And as explained later, the majority 
opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick75 
expressly rejected a broad reading of Fraser.76 
D. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,77 the Court considered “the 
extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the 
contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s 
journalism curriculum.”78  A high school principal withheld two 
articles for publication in the school-sponsored student newspaper.79  
The newspaper was written and edited by a Journalism II class, but 
the school maintained ultimate editorial control over its contents.80  
One deleted article involved three students’ experiences with 
                                                          
 71. Sarah Tope Reise, Comment, “Just Say No” to Pro-Drug and Alcohol Student 
Speech:  The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech Promoting Drug and 
Alcohol Use, 57 EMORY L.J. 1259, 1279 (2008). 
 72. Id. at 1289. 
 73. Id. (citations omitted). 
 74. See K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 
WL 2175166, at *5–7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (explaining that a student’s shirt that 
condemned abortion constituted protected speech because the clothing was not 
obscene and did not disrupt the school environment).   
 75. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 76. See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text (noting that in Morse both the 
majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion endorse a more limited view 
of Fraser). 
 77. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 78. Id. at 262. 
 79. Id. at 263–64. 
 80. Id. at 263. 
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pregnancy.81  The principal believed that the references to sexual 
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger 
readers and was also concerned that the pregnant students might be 
identifiable from the article’s text.82  The other article discussed 
divorce’s impact on students and included one student’s critical 
remarks about her father.83  The principal believed that the father 
mentioned in the divorce article should be able to respond but there 
was not sufficient time to alter the article before the newspaper was 
published.84 
In discussing Tinker’s application to the case at hand, the Court 
noted the key difference between the question considered in Tinker 
of “whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate 
particular student speech” and the question raised in the instant case 
of “whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to 
promote particular student speech.”85  The Court observed that: 
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a 
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school 
premises.  The latter question concerns educators’ authority over 
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.86 
The Court declined to apply the Tinker standard to the case at 
hand or classify the newspaper as a “public forum,”87 instead holding 
that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”88  The Court 
stated: 
[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or 
producer of a school play “disassociate itself,” not only from speech 
that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . or impinge 
upon the rights of other students,” but also from speech that is, for 
example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, 
                                                          
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 263–64. 
 85. Id. at 270. 
 86. Id. at 270–71. 
 87. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). 
 88. Id. at 273. 
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biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for 
immature audiences.89 
In addition, it noted that “[a] school must also retain the authority to 
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived 
to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct 
otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social 
order.’”90  The Court upheld the school’s exercise of editorial 
discretion in the case at hand, stating “we cannot reject as 
unreasonable Principal Reynolds’s conclusion that neither the 
pregnancy article nor the divorce article was suitable for publication 
in Spectrum.”91  
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, 
acknowledged in his dissenting opinion that “student speech in the 
noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate 
pedagogical purpose.”92  However, Justice Brennan expressed his 
concern that affording schools unduly broad authority to censor 
student expression that contradicts their educational missions would 
have grave consequences for student speech rights.  He noted that 
“[a] student who responds to a political science teacher’s question 
with the retort, ‘socialism is good,’ subverts the school’s inculcation 
of the message that capitalism is better.”93  Furthermore, he noted 
that “public educators must accommodate some student expression 
even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those 
the school wishes to inculcate.”94 
Hazelwood has minimal relevance to the issue of expression through 
student clothing because no person could reasonably believe that the 
message a student conveys through clothing “bear[s] the imprimatur 
of the school.”95  However, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion 
serves as a reminder that schools do not have carte blanche to censor 
student expression that presents a viewpoint that conflicts with the 
school’s own message.96 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 271 (citations omitted). 
 90. Id. at 272 (citation omitted). 
 91. Id. at 276. 
 92. Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 279. 
 94. Id. at 280. 
 95. Id. at 271 (majority opinion); see also id. at 270–71 (distinguishing between 
student speech that is a “student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the 
school premises” and “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and 
other expressive activities that . . . might reasonably [be] perceived[d] . . . as part of 
the school curriculum”). 
 96. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stressing that “mere incompatibility 
with the school’s pedagogical message” does not permit a school to restrict a 
student’s speech). 
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E. Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse v. Frederick,97 a high school allowed students to leave class 
to observe the Olympic Torch Relay as it proceeded along a street in 
front of the school.98  The school treated the occasion as a school-
sponsored event similar to a field trip and teachers monitored the 
students’ behavior.99  “As the torchbearers and camera crews passed 
by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the 
phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”100  The principal interpreted the 
banner to encourage illegal drug use in violation of school policy and 
told the student to take it down.101 
The Supreme Court held that “schools may take steps to safeguard 
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.  We conclude that the 
school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by 
confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student 
responsible for it.”102  The Court observed that, while “[t]he message 
on Frederick’s banner [was] cryptic,” it was reasonable for the 
principal to conclude that it promoted illegal drug use (rather than 
any political or religious message).103 
The Court reviewed previous cases that established that “the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”104 
and that the rights of students “must be ‘applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment.’”105  After reviewing 
its previous student speech cases,106 the Court emphasized that 
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, 
perhaps compelling’ interest.”107  The Court declared that “[t]he 
‘special characteristics of the school environment’ and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow 
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use.”108  
                                                          
 97. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 98. Id. at 2622. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2622–23. 
 102. Id. at 2622. 
 103. Id. at 2624–25. 
 104. Id. at 2622 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 
(1986)). 
 105. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)). 
 106. Id. at 2625–27 (outlining the holdings of Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood). 
 107. Id. at 2628 (citation omitted). 
 108. Id. at 2629 (citations omitted). 
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Importantly, the Court rejected the school’s expansive view of 
Fraser: 
Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Frederick’s 
speech is proscribable because it is plainly “offensive” as that term 
is used in Fraser.  We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case 
should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under 
some definition of “offensive.”  After all, much political and religious 
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.109 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurring 
opinion that stated their view that the majority opinion applied to 
situations where student speech advocates illegal drug use.110 
Moreover, the majority opinion “provides no support for any 
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting 
on any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal 
use.’”111 
Justice Alito pointed out that the Court rejected “the broad 
argument . . . that the First Amendment permits public school 
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s 
‘educational mission.’”112  Justice Alito further observed: 
The “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the 
elected and appointed public officials with authority over the 
schools and by the school administrators and faculty.  As a result, 
some public schools have defined their educational missions as 
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are 
held by the members of these groups. 
 . . . The “educational mission” argument would give public 
school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and 
social issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.  
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First 
Amendment.113 
Justice Breyer wrote separately to express his concern that, “while 
the [Court’s] holding is theoretically limited to speech promoting 
the use of illegal drugs, it could in fact authorize further viewpoint-
based restrictions.”114  Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that 
was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.115  The dissent 
                                                          
 109. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 111. Id. (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 2637 (citation omitted). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 115. Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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characterized the banner’s “oblique”116 drug reference as one “that 
was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything.”117  Justice 
Stevens declared that “the First Amendment protects student speech 
if the message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly 
advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students.”118  In the 
dissenters’ view, the principal’s decision to require the student to 
take the banner down was based on disagreement with the speaker’s 
pro-drug viewpoint119 which violated the “‘bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment . . . that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’”120  
Justice Stevens stated, “While I find it hard to believe the Court 
would support punishing Frederick for flying a ‘WINE SiPS 4 JESUS’ 
banner—which could quite reasonably be construed either as a 
protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message—the 
breathtaking sweep of its opinion suggests it would.”121  The dissent 
declared that the First Amendment provides vigorous protection for 
unpopular viewpoints, noting that, “[i]n the national debate about a 
serious issue, it is the expression of the minority’s viewpoint that most 
demands the protection of the First Amendment.”122 
Much of the legal commentary discussing Morse has declared that 
the decision signals a continued narrowing of student speech rights.  
One scholar has stated that, “despite the [Morse] Court’s apparent 
confidence in the limited scope of its ruling, this decision is likely to 
significantly increase the ability of schools to impose content-based 
restrictions on student speech.”123  Another author has highlighted 
the fact that “Morse did not foreclose the possibility that the Court’s 
student speech cases can be read together to permit some viewpoint 
discrimination.”124  Moreover, many scholars believe that “schools and 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2644. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2645–46. 
 120. Id. at 2645 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 121. Id. at 2650. 
 122. Id. at 2651 (citations omitted). 
 123. Joanna Nairn, Recent Development, Free Speech 4 Students?  Morse v. Frederick 
and the Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239, 239 (2008). 
 124. Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious Speech and Viewpoint 
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 220 (2007); see also Brannon P. Denning & 
Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech,  
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 862–63 (2008) (“Morse compounds the problem by 
creating a viewpoint-based exception, not merely a content-based one:  Only speech 
that encourages or celebrates the use of illegal drugs is punished; speech that 
denigrates drug use (‘BONG HITS R 4 LOSERS’?) is presumably permissible.”); 
Nairn, supra note 123, at 256 (“Absent the healthy fear of viewpoint discrimination 
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courts will have wide latitude not only in deciding how and when to 
apply Frederick to student drug-related speech, but also in deciding 
what other viewpoints are simply outside a student’s right to freedom 
of expression.”125  For example, one scholar has noted: 
Nothing in the Court’s decision presents itself as a means to 
differentiate pro-drug speech from other unpopular speech . . . 
such as speech that glorifies guns, extols alcohol consumption, or 
encourages reckless driving. . . .  
 . . . [S]ome leeway may exist for lower courts to extend the 
ruling in Morse to topics of speech such as smoking, gambling, 
sexual activity, and teenage pregnancy—activities that are not 
illegal for the population as a whole, as drug use is, but that many 
people would view as harmful to students.126 
A better view, however, is that “Morse appears to be a case about 
illegal drug use and nothing more”127 and, as such, its “implications 
for the issue of viewpoint discrimination in general are (at least in the 
short term) quite limited.”128  In addition, the Morse Court rejected 
some of the school district’s broadest arguments.129  Commentators 
have pointed out that the Morse Court squarely rejected the school 
board’s arguments that Fraser should be read to apply to any 
“offensive” speech and that schools should be able to bar expression 
that contradicts any “educational mission.”130 
                                                          
demonstrated in Tinker, the ruling in Morse could easily extend far outside the starkly 
pro-illegal drug messages with which the Court was concerned.”). 
 125. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 296, 296 
(2007); see also Nairn, supra note 123, at 256 (“The chilling effect that this decision 
will have upon students is likely to be profound, as it will embolden school 
administrators who wish to engage in increasingly restrictive speech regulation and 
will encourage lower courts to be more reluctant to strike down such policies.”). 
 126. Nairn, supra note 123, at 252; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 124, at 
865 (“[A]ll manner of speech encouraging or celebrating activities that are physically 
dangerous—from driving fast to having sex—is potentially the subject of a similar 
categorical exclusion.”); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 125, 
at 304 (noting that Justice Alito “issued a conclusory statement:  ‘[I]llegal drug use 
presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students.’  
Perhaps; but so do gun violence, unprotected sexual intercourse, traffic accidents 
involving inexperienced drivers, anorexia, and obesity—to take some of the more 
popularly known examples” (citation omitted)). 
 127. Taylor, supra note 70, at 228 n.18. 
 128. Id. at 228. 
 129. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (refusing to endorse the 
school district’s argument that Frederick’s banner should be banned as being 
“plainly ‘offensive’” speech because such a reading is inconsistent with the Court’s 
precedent in Fraser).  
 130. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 124, at 882; see also Stephen Kanter, 
Bong Hits 4 Jesus as a Cautionary Tale of Two Cities, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 61, 92 
(2008) (explaining that the Morse majority “flatly reject[ed] Dean Starr’s enormously 
broad argument on behalf of petitioners that the Court should sanction the power of 
school officials to censor student speech simply because it is ‘offensive.’” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 94 (“Justices Alito and Kennedy categorically rejected another broad 
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One commentator has stated that Morse does not provide a green 
light for schools to censor religious t-shirts, even those deemed to be 
“aggressive” in nature: “It would be difficult to find that the aggressive 
religious statements on students’ T-shirts create the same sort of 
actual physical danger to the overwhelming number of public school 
students across the country as illegal drug use does.”131 
Morse simply established that schools need not tolerate advocacy of 
illegal behavior; the opinion does not allow for restriction of 
religious, political, or unpopular speech.132  As such, Tinker remains 
the most relevant case in situations involving school censorship of 
religious or pro-life clothing.133 
II. LOWER COURT CASES DEALING WITH “CONTROVERSIAL” 
RELIGIOUS OR PRO-LIFE STUDENT SPEECH 
As discussed in the previous Section, the Supreme Court’s cases 
dealing with student speech have established a general framework 
while leaving important questions unanswered.  Lower courts have 
used different modes of analysis—and have reached different 
results—in applying Supreme Court precedent in cases involving 
student religious, or pro-life, clothing.  This Section reviews several 
leading lower court cases and argues for expansive protection of 
student speech. 
A. Cases Providing Broad Protection for “Controversial” Religious  
or Pro-Life Student Speech 
Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education,134 K.D. ex rel. 
Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District,135 and Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State 
College Area School District136 provide broad protection of student 
speech and, in our view, present a proper reading of Tinker and 
Fraser. 
                                                          
censorial argument advanced by counsel for the principal, the school board, and the 
United States. . . . [The argument] would have permitted school officials to censor 
student speech whenever it interfered with the school’s self-defined ‘educational 
mission.’” (citation omitted)). 
 131. Bowman, supra note 124, at 221. 
 132. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (explaining that public school districts are not 
permitted to proscribe speech merely because it is offensive, since protected political 
and religious speech could be potentially offensive). 
 133. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) 
(describing the armbands that the students wore as a form of political expression no 
different than a political discussion that could not be limited unless it significantly 
disrupted the school’s work). 
 134. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 135. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005). 
 136. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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1. Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education  
Nixon involved a Christian middle school student, James Nixon, 
who wore a t-shirt to school that said “INTOLERANT . . . Jesus 
said . . . I am the way, the truth and the life. John 14:6” on the front 
and the following on the back: “Homosexuality is a sin!  Islam is a lie!  
Abortion is murder!  Some issues are just black and white!”137  School 
officials would not allow him to continue wearing the shirt, citing a 
policy prohibiting student attire that “disrupts the educational 
process” or is “suggestive, obscene, or offensive.”138 
The court stated that “[t]here is no evidence that James’ T-shirt 
caused any disruption at the school. . . . He has worn other shirts to 
school that contain religious messages such as ‘WWJD’ referring to 
the phrase ‘What Would Jesus Do?’”139  The court issued an 
injunction forbidding school officials from preventing James from 
wearing his t-shirt “[a]s long as the shirt is not substantially disrupting 
or interfering with the school’s activities and an imminent and 
substantial disruption is not likely to occur.”140 
The school argued that “James does not have a constitutional right 
to wear the shirt to school since its message is plainly offensive (under 
Fraser) and invades on the rights of others (under Tinker).”141  After 
reviewing Fraser, the court concluded that “a school may prohibit 
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech since it 
undermines a school’s basic educational mission.”142 
After discussing how other courts had applied or declined to apply 
Fraser in student speech cases,143 the court rejected the school’s 
interpretation of Fraser, stating: 
Fraser and its progeny of cases all deal with speech that is offensive 
because of the manner in which it is conveyed.  Examples are 
speech containing vulgar language, graphic sexual innuendos, or 
                                                          
 137. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 138. Id. at 968 (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 975. 
 141. Id. at 970. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 970–71 (citing Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 
471 (6th Cir. 2000), which upheld a school’s refusal to allow Marilyn Manson t-shirts 
due to the singer’s support of drug use, suicide, and murder in his lyrics; Smith ex rel. 
Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2003), 
which upheld discipline for student commentary about a school’s tardy policy that 
included references to sexual activity of school administrators; Barber ex rel. Barber v. 
Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2003), which held that 
Fraser was inapplicable in a case involving a t-shirt displaying a photo of President 
George W. Bush with the phrase “International Terrorist”; and Bragg v. Swanson, 371 
F. Supp. 2d 814, 823 (W.D.W. Va. 2005), which held that Fraser was inapplicable in a 
case involving a Confederate flag shirt). 
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speech that promotes suicide, drugs, alcohol, or murder.  Rather 
than being concerned with the actual content of what is being 
conveyed, the Fraser justification for regulating speech is more 
concerned with the plainly offensive manner in which it is 
conveyed.144 
In addition, the court held that “[s]peech that contains a 
potentially offensive political viewpoint is not included in this 
category of regulated expression.”145  In other words, where the 
alleged offensive nature of expression stems from the viewpoints 
conveyed rather than the manner in which the expression occurs, 
restrictions on such expression are governed by Tinker, not Fraser.146 
Regarding Tinker’s applicability to the case at hand, the court 
observed that there was no history of disorder in the school, and the 
mere fact that Muslims, homosexuals, and those who have had 
abortions at the school may be offended by the shirt was insufficient 
to justify the school’s actions.147 
In addition, the court rejected the school’s claim that the t-shirt 
was an “invasion on the rights of others” under Tinker.148  The court 
stated that it was “not aware of a single decision that has focused on 
that language in Tinker as the sole basis for upholding a school’s 
regulation of student speech.”149  The court concluded that “invading 
on the rights of other students entails invading on other students’ 
rights to be secure and to be let alone.”150  The court stated that, 
“[j]ust as in Tinker, there is no evidence that James’ silent, passive 
expression of opinion interfered with the work of Sheridan Middle 
School or collided with the rights of other students to be let alone.”151 
Nixon’s robust protection of controversial student speech is 
consistent with both Tinker and Fraser.  The student’s t-shirt conveyed, 
in admittedly strong terms, his beliefs about Christianity, Islam, 
abortion, and homosexuality.152  The t-shirt was likely to spark 
conversation or debate from time to time as other students expressed 
their agreement or disagreement with his religious, moral, or 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 971 (citations omitted). 
 145. Id. (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 973.  The court continued, noting that “[i]f the mere fact that other 
students will likely find a message offensive justified a school’s regulation of 
expression, then a student’s right to freely express himself would be greatly 
diminished.”  Id. at 973 n.11. 
 148. Id. at 974. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra text accompanying note 137 (describing Nixon’s t-shirt). 
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political views.153  However, nothing about the t-shirt was so inherently 
likely to incite substantial disruption or violence to justify the school’s 
decision to censor it.154  The appropriate response for the school 
would have been to ensure that students who disagreed with the t-
shirt’s message were permitted to express their own counter-
messages.  This response is consistent with the principle that 
“[a]chieving free expression requires an open marketplace in which 
citizens are susceptible to varied viewpoints” and that “schools are 
parts of that marketplace, with students entitled to the privileges of 
citizenry.”155  
The court in Nixon properly rejected the view that Tinker permits 
high schools to censor student expression due to the perceived 
“psychological vulnerability” of students even in the absence of 
substantial disruption of the school environment.156  Such a broad 
censorship authority would be “an affront to our nation’s historical 
commitment to a freedom of speech that absorbs the risk of 
provoking debate, disturbance, and personal offense.”157  While one 
author has argued that the District Court in Nixon “did not take 
affronts to identity interest seriously,”158 the fact remains that Tinker 
provides robust protection for student speech that is not likely to 
cause substantial disruption.159  A large amount of student religious, 
pro-life, or political speech could be interpreted as an affront to the 
identity of other students with different belief systems, but that is no 
justification for censoring student speech.160  High school students—
many of whom are seventeen or eighteen years old—do not have a 
                                                          
 153. See Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (acknowledging that certain groups, 
including “Muslims, homosexuals, and those who [had] had abortions,” might have 
been offended by the t-shirt). 
 154. See id. (finding that the “mere fact that [certain] groups . . . could find the 
shirt’s message offensive, falls well short of the Tinker standard for reasonably 
anticipat[ing] a disruption of school activities” that would justify banning the t-shirt). 
 155. Russomanno, supra note 46, at 375–76. 
 156. Amanda L. Houle, Note, From T-Shirts to Teaching:  May Public Schools 
Constitutionally Regulate Antihomosexual Speech?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2477, 2501 (2008) 
(citing Richard Fossey et al., Harper v. Poway Unified School District:  Schools Can 
Ban Demeaning Speech Toward Vulnerable Students Without Offending the First Amendment, 
211 EDUC. L. REP. 559, 570–72 (2006)). 
 157. Id. (citing Fossey et al., supra note 156, at 570–71). 
 158. Holning Lau, Pluralism:  A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 317, 368 (2007). 
 159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510–11 (1969) 
(noting that the school singled out the students who opposed the Vietnam War, the 
Court stated that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least 
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference 
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible”). 
 160. See Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206–07 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that prohibiting speech simply because a listener may 
find it offensive is not constitutionally permissible).  
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“right” to be sheltered from religious, pro-life, or political expression 
that may offend them, just as they will not have such a right once they 
leave school.161 
2. K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District 
There are few reported opinions that deal with student pro-life 
shirts,162 and cases involving pro-life literature distribution raise 
different issues than pro-life clothing cases and have produced 
conflicting results.163  In the leading case on pro-life clothing, K.D. ex 
rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District,164 the United States District 
Court for the Western District of New York upheld the First 
Amendment right of a high school sophomore to wear a pro-life  
t-shirt to school.165  The front of the t-shirt stated in large capital 
letters: “ABORTION IS HOMICIDE,” while the back of the shirt 
contained several phrases: “You will not silence my message”; “You 
will not mock my God”; “You will stop killing my generation”; and 
“Rock for Life!”166 
                                                          
 161. See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Education:  Between Two 
Democracies, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 999, 1015–17 (2008) (discussing the Court’s 
treatment of the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses and arguing that religious 
speech will likely be protected while more controversial speech will likely not be 
protected). 
 162. In Heinkel ex rel. Heinkel v. School Board, the Eleventh Circuit noted in an 
unpublished opinion that a middle school allowed students to wear a t-shirt that read 
“Day of Remembrance, 45 Million lost to abortion since 1973, Remembering in 
silence.” on the front and “We give a voice to those who cannot speak.  We stand for 
those who never could.  We remember the 1/3 of our generation lost.” on the back.  
No. 05-13813, 2006 WL 2417296, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (per curiam).  The 
court held that the school’s refusal to allow a student to distribute pro-life literature 
to her classmates was justified by a reasonable belief that substantial disruption could 
occur.  Id. at *3–5.  The court found it significant that the students in the middle 
school ranged from age eleven to fourteen and the school did not include abortion 
or birth control as part of the curriculum.  Id.  Importantly, however, the court 
invalidated the school’s written policy, which prohibited the distribution of all 
religious or political literature, stating that the ban was “a content-based restriction 
unsupported by a reasonable belief of the School Board that all such expression 
would create substantial disruption in the Lee County schools.”  Id. at *3. 
 163. Compare M.A.L. ex rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841, 847–50 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a middle school does not have to show that unregulated literature 
distribution would cause substantial disruption before it may impose content-neutral 
time, place, and manner restrictions in a case involving pro-life literature), with 
Raker v. Frederick County Pub. Sch., 470 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (W.D. Va. 2007) 
(holding that a high school’s policy limiting student distribution of literature was 
invalid because there was no evidence that substantial disruption would otherwise 
occur in a case involving pro-life literature). 
 164. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005). 
 165. See id. at *6 (applying the Tinker standard based on the content of the t-shirt, 
the court determined that the school failed to show that K.D’s t-shirt interfered with 
or disturbed school activities). 
 166. Id. at *1. 
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The Principal told the student that the shirt violated the school’s 
dress code because it was inappropriate and interfered with the 
educational process.167  Three female students complained to a 
teacher that they were “upset” by the t-shirt.168 Because the school’s 
dress code mandated suspension for students who refused to modify 
attire found to be in violation of the dress code,169 the student was 
forced to stop wearing the t-shirt out of fear of a suspension.170 
In considering whether the school had violated the student’s 
freedom of speech, the court reviewed Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.171  
The court held that the student’s attire “is not . . . a school-sponsored 
expressive activity, and thus the Hazelwood standard does not apply to 
this case.”172  The court also held that the school’s objection to the  
t-shirt was based on the content of the message and, therefore, 
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard applied.173  The court 
explained: 
K.D.’s expression of his pro-life message was political speech. . . .  
Although defendants argue that the message is “aggressive,” there 
is no evidence showing that K.D. did anything more than walk 
through the hallways and attend his classes while wearing the T-
shirt. . . . Like the Tinker students, he merely went about his 
ordained rounds during the school day.174 
The court further explained that the fact that students at the 
school may find the shirt very offensive, including students who have 
had an abortion, is “insufficient to satisfy the Tinker standard.”175  The 
court added that student complaints about the content of the t-shirt 
“simply do not rise to the level of a ‘disruption’ much less a ‘material 
and substantial interference’ with K.D.’s classes or the overall 
administration of the school,” and also noted, “[c]ertainly students 
do not have the right not to be ‘upset’ when confronted with a 
viewpoint with which they disagree.”176  As such, the court granted the 
student’s motion for a preliminary injunction.177  
The opinion in K.D. stands for the proposition that censorship of a 
pro-life message is not justified simply because a student may find it 
                                                          
 167. Id. at *2. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at *2 n.6. 
 170. Id. at *2. 
 171. Id. at *3–4. 
 172. Id. at *4. 
 173. Id. at *6. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *6 n.12 (citations omitted). 
 176. Id. at *6. 
 177. Id. at *7. 
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to be “offensive,” or may be upset by it.178  While the subject of 
abortion is certainly controversial, it is no more controversial than 
the Vietnam War at issue in Tinker, yet the Court upheld the students’ 
right to wear an armband in protest.179  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “[m]en and women of good conscience can 
disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the 
profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.”180  Indeed, a pro-life t-shirt is a 
peaceful, non-disruptive way for students to express their viewpoint 
on “the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.”181  Those who disagree with a 
student’s pro-life viewpoint should be mindful of the Barnette Court’s 
statement that “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much”182 and that “scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual” is a core aspect of our system of 
government.183 
3. Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State College Area School District 
In Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State College Area School District,184 Christian 
students challenged a school district’s “anti-harassment” policy.185  
The students believed that the policy prohibited them from 
distributing religious literature that conveyed the belief that 
homosexuality is a sin.186  The policy defined prohibited harassment 
as “verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or perceived 
race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s 
educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
                                                          
 178. See id. at *6 (recognizing that, while a school can prohibit student speech if it 
interferes with the rights of other students, there is no right to be free from differing 
viewpoints). 
 179. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 n.4, 513 
(1969) (observing that at the time of the armband prohibition, “debate over the Viet 
Nam war had become vehement in many localities” and later holding that the 
Constitution protects a student’s right to engage controversial issues so long as 
school activities are not disrupted). 
 180. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 181. See id. 
 182. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 183. Id. at 637. 
 184. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 185. Id. at 203–04. 
 186. See id. at 203, 206 n.6, 207 (noting that anti-discrimination laws regulate 
speech based on content and viewpoint and require the “most exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny”). 
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offensive environment.”187  According to the policy, harassment 
includes “any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which 
offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any of the 
[listed] characteristics.”188 
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, then-Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Alito stated that the 
school’s policy was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.189  
Judge Alito rejected the district court’s conclusion that the anti-
harassment policy went no further than federal and state  
anti-harassment law.190  The court observed that “there is . . . no 
question that the free speech clause protects a wide variety of speech 
that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including statements 
that impugn another’s race or national origin or that denigrate 
religious beliefs.”191  In addition, “‘[h]arassing’ or discriminatory 
speech, although evil and offensive, may be used to communicate 
ideas or emotions that nevertheless implicate First Amendment 
protections.”192 
The court took issue with a provision of the policy that prohibited 
disparaging speech that was directed at a person’s values, stating: 
[T]he Policy strikes at the heart of moral and political discourse—
the lifeblood of constitutional self government (and democratic 
education) and the core concern of the First Amendment.  That 
speech about “values” may offend is not cause for its prohibition, 
but rather the reason for its protection: “a principal ‘function of 
free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute.’”193 
The court declared that, “[a]s subsequent federal cases have made 
clear, Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of disruption, not 
just some remote apprehension of disturbance.”194  In addition, “the 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 202. 
 188. Id. at 202–03. 
 189. See id. at 215 (reasoning that the school’s policy was overbroad because it 
purported to restrict any unwelcome verbal conduct and the Supreme Court has 
continually held that “the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content 
of speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting it”). 
 190. Id. at 204–06. 
 191. Id. at 206. 
 192. Id. at 209. 
 193. Id. at 210 (citation omitted). 
 194. Id. at 211.  The court then highlighted a variety of cases where a fear of 
disruption was unfounded.  See id. at 211–12 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. 
Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992), which held that the school failed to show 
that “SCAB” buttons worn to protest replacement teachers during a strike were 
“inherently disruptive” to school activities, Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 
976 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1997), where a school provided “insufficient 
evidence of actual disruption” in prohibiting a Catholic student from wearing a 
rosary because some gang members had worn rosaries as their identifying symbols, 
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mere desire to avoid ‘discomfort’ or ‘unpleasantness’ is not enough 
to justify restricting student speech under Tinker.  However, if a 
school can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—
especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar speech—
the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”195 
In this case, the school could not demonstrate that “the Policy’s 
restrictions are necessary to prevent substantial disruption or 
interference with the work of the school or the rights of other 
students.”196  While the provision prohibiting speech that would 
“‘substantially interfer[e] with a student’s educational performance’ 
may satisfy the Tinker standard,”197 the provision prohibiting speech 
that “creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” was 
overly broad.198  The court noted that “[t]he precise scope of Tinker’s 
‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear; at least 
one court has opined that it covers only independently tortious 
speech like libel, slander or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”199  The court explained that “it is certainly not enough that 
the speech is merely offensive to some listener,” as “much ‘core’ 
political and religious speech”200 falls into that category.  Finally, the 
court stated that “[a]lthough [the school district] correctly asserts 
that it has a compelling interest in promoting an educational 
environment that is safe and conducive to learning, it fails to provide 
any particularized reason as to why it anticipates substantial 
disruption from the broad swath of student speech prohibited under 
the Policy.”201 
While Nixon, K.D., and Saxe are not the only cases that have upheld 
the right of students to engage in controversial religious or pro-life 
speech,202 they illustrate a proper application of Tinker.  In the context 
                                                          
and Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 116, 120 (N.D. Tex. 1992), which 
determined that a school failed to demonstrate material or substantial disruption of 
school functions caused by distribution of religious tracts). 
 195. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212 (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358 
(10th Cir. 2000)). 
 196. Id. at 216. 
 197. Id. at 217 (alteration in original). 
 198. Id. (alteration in original). 
 199. Id. (citing Slotterback ex rel. Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 
280, 289 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. In Chambers v. Babbitt, the court upheld a high school student’s right to wear a 
shirt to school that said “Straight Pride” on the front and had a symbol of a man and 
a woman holding hands on the back.  145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072–74 (D. Minn. 
2001).  The court rejected the school’s contention that the student’s expression 
could be restricted due to unrelated racial incidents and an incident of vandalism of 
a gay student’s car.  Id. at 1071–72.  The court declared: 
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of the Vietnam War, the Tinker Court was keenly aware of the need to 
protect “controversial” student expression from censorship and 
expressly held that a student “may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 
‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without 
colliding with the rights of others.”203  Tinker’s protection of 
“controversial” expression would be rendered meaningless if school 
authorities could cite the mere existence of a controversy as the basis 
for suppressing speech.204  
B. Cases Providing Moderate or Minimal Protection for “Controversial” 
Religious or Pro-Life Student Speech 
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie School District205 provides moderate protection for controversial 
student religious expression, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper ex 
rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District206 provides schools with broad 
leeway to restrict student speech and poses a substantial threat to the 
future of student religious and pro-life expression. 
1. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District 
In Nuxoll, the Seventh Circuit upheld a high school student’s right 
to wear a shirt that said “Be Happy, Not Gay,” while belittling the 
importance of protecting student speech.207  Some students at the 
school participated in a “Day of Silence” event that sought to 
promote tolerance for homosexuals by remaining silent throughout 
the day and wearing expressive t-shirts.208  On the following day, 
                                                          
Maintaining a school community of tolerance includes the tolerance of such 
viewpoints as expressed by “Straight Pride.”  While the sentiment behind the 
“Straight Pride” message appears to be one of intolerance, the responsibility 
remains with the school and its community to maintain an environment 
open to diversity and to educate and support its students as they confront 
ideas different from their own. 
Id. at 1073. 
 203. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in original). 
 204. See id. at 512–14 (recognizing that interpersonal communication is an 
important part of the educational process and inferring that controversial issues 
further the educational process by providing a platform for students to form 
opinions, express those opinions, and learn to communicate with one another). 
 205. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 206. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
 207. See Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 676 (holding that the student’s shirt could not be 
linked to any harassment and was highly unlikely to “poison the educational 
atmosphere”). 
 208. Id. at 670. 
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students who objected to homosexual behavior participated in a “Day 
of Truth” event by wearing shirts with messages such as “Day of 
Truth . . . The Truth cannot be silenced.”209  One student’s t-shirt 
said, “Be Happy, Not Gay” on the back, but the school inked out the 
“Not Gay” language.210  The school considered “Be Happy, Not Gay” 
to be a derogatory comment on a particular sexual orientation in 
violation of a school rule forbidding “derogatory comments . . . that 
refer to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or 
disability.”211 
A student who wanted to wear a “Be Happy, Not Gay” shirt to 
school challenged the school’s policy on its face as well as its 
application to his particular shirt.212  He argued that he had the right 
to wear any t-shirt that condemns homosexual behavior that does not 
amount to “fighting words” (for example, a shirt stating 
“homosexuals go to Hell” could be prohibited).213  Judge Posner’s 
majority opinion argued for the broad authority of schools to 
regulate controversial student speech: 
A heavy federal constitutional hand on the regulation of student 
speech by school authorities would make little sense.  The 
contribution that kids can make to the marketplace in ideas and 
opinions is modest and a school’s countervailing interest in 
protecting its students from offensive speech by their classmates is 
undeniable.214 
The court held that the school’s policy was reasonable in light of 
the fact that “[p]eople are easily upset by comments about their race, 
sex, etc., including their sexual orientation, because for most people 
these are major components of their personal identity—none more 
so than a sexual orientation that deviates from the norm.”215 
The court found the free speech interests at stake to be minimal, 
stating that “uninhibited high-school student hallway debate over 
sexuality—whether carried out in the form of dueling T-shirts, 
dueling banners, dueling pamphlets, annotated Bibles, or soapbox 
oratory—[is not] an essential preparation for the exercise of the 
franchise.”216  In addition, the court stated that 
                                                          
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 671; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting 
that speech can be limited when it falls within a few narrow categories, including 
insulting or fighting words that are reasonably likely to incite a breach of the peace). 
 214. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 671. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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[w]e foresee a deterioration in the school’s ability to educate its 
students if negative comments on homosexuality by students like 
Nuxoll who believe that the Bible is the word of God to be 
interpreted literally incite negative comments on the Bible by 
students who believe either that there is no God or that the Bible 
should be interpreted figuratively.  Mutual respect and forbearance 
enforced by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of 
a minimally decorous atmosphere for learning.217 
Importantly, the court rejected the school’s argument based on 
Tinker’s “rights of others” language, noting that “people do not have a 
legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or for that matter their 
way of life.”218  Additionally, the court observed that “[t]here is no 
indication that the negative comments that the plaintiff wants to 
make about homosexuals or homosexuality names or otherwise 
targets an individual or is defamatory.”219  Tinker “was a quite different 
case from this” because, in the court’s view, the school in Tinker “was 
discriminating against a particular point of view, namely opposition 
to the Vietnam war expressed by the wearing of black armbands,”220 
because “ban[ning] all discussion of the Vietnam war would in reality 
have been taking sides—would have delighted the government—
because the debate over the war was started, maintained, and 
escalated by the war’s opponents.”221 
The court concluded that a school is not “required to prove that 
unless the speech at issue is forbidden serious consequences will in 
fact ensue. . . . It is enough for the school to present ‘facts which 
might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial 
disruption.’”222  The court noted that “one of the concerns expressed 
by the Supreme Court in Morse was with the psychological effects of 
drugs”223 and it stated:  “[i]magine the psychological effects if the 
plaintiff wore a T-shirt on which was written ‘blacks have lower IQs 
than whites’ or ‘a woman’s place is in the home.’”224  The court 
concluded that schools may regulate speech that school officials 
believe “will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in 
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of 
substantial disruption.”225 
                                                          
 217. Id. at 672. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 673. 
 221. Id. at 675. 
 222. Id. at 673 (citation omitted). 
 223. Id. at 674 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628–29 (2007)). 
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While the court noted that the school’s policy would be 
problematic “if the school understood ‘derogatory comments’ to 
embrace any statement that could be construed by the very sensitive 
as critical of one of the protected group identities,”226 the court stated 
that “high-school students are not adults, schools are not public 
meeting halls, children are in school to be taught by adults rather 
than to practice attacking each other with wounding words, and 
school authorities have a protective relationship and responsibility to 
all the students.”227 
Regarding the policy’s applicability to the “Be Happy, Not Gay”  
t-shirt, the court stated that “[o]ne cannot even be certain that it is a 
‘derogatory’ comment; for ‘not gay’ is a synonym for ‘straight,’ yet 
the school has told us that it would not object to a T-shirt that said 
‘Be Happy, Be Straight.’”228  The court declared that, while a student 
wearing the t-shirt “is expressing disapproval of homosexuality,” its 
message “is only tepidly negative; ‘derogatory’ or ‘demeaning’ seems 
too strong a characterization.”229  In addition, while there had been 
past incidents of harassment of homosexual students at the school, “it 
is highly speculative that allowing the plaintiff to wear a T-shirt that 
says ‘Be Happy, Not Gay’ would have even a slight tendency to 
provoke such incidents, or for that matter to poison the educational 
atmosphere.”230 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rovner criticized the majority’s 
dismissive attitude toward student speech: 
Youth are often the vanguard of social change.  Anyone who thinks 
otherwise has not been paying attention to the civil rights 
movement, the women’s rights movement, the anti-war protests for 
Vietnam and Iraq, and the [2008] presidential primaries where the 
youth voice and the youth vote are having a substantial impact.  
And now youth are leading a broad, societal change in attitude 
towards homosexuals, forming alliances among lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgendered (“LGBT”) and heterosexual students to 
discuss issues of importance related to sexual orientation.  They 
have initiated a dialogue in which Nuxoll wishes to participate.231 
Moreover, Judge Rovner observed that the young adults, whom the 
majority dismissed as “kids” and “children,” will soon be eligible to 
vote, to marry and to serve in the military, among other important 
                                                          
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 674–75. 
 228. Id. at 675. 
 229. Id. at 676. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 677–78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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rights and duties that adults hold.232  Judge Rovner further stated, “I 
view this as a simple case,”233 and explained that “[t]he school district 
has ‘not demonstrate[d] any facts which might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities.’”234 
Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority’s characterization of 
Tinker as a case about viewpoint discrimination, stating that “[i]t is 
more appropriately characterized as a discussion about subject matter 
discrimination, although the opinion is not limited to the 
circumstance where the school has banned all discussion of a 
particular subject.”235  While considering the language “Be Happy, 
Not Gay” to be “derogatory” and “disparaging,”236 Judge Rovner stated 
that “it is not the kind of speech that would materially and 
substantially interfere with school activities.”237  She continued, 
declaring that “[t]here is a significant difference between expressing 
one’s religiously-based disapproval of homosexuality and targeting 
LGBT students for harassment.  Though probably offensive to most 
LGBT students, the former is not likely by itself to create a hostile 
environment.”238  Judge Rovner concluded that “[t]he First 
Amendment as interpreted by Tinker is consistent with the school’s 
mission to teach by encouraging debate on controversial topics while 
also allowing the school to limit the debate when it becomes 
substantially disruptive.  Nuxoll’s slogan-adorned t-shirt comes 
nowhere near that standard.”239 
Judge Rovner’s concurring opinion is more consistent with Tinker 
than Judge Posner’s majority opinion.  Judge Posner’s flippant 
statement that “[t]he contribution that kids can make to the 
marketplace in ideas and opinions is modest”240 was effectively 
countered by Judge Rovner’s observation that those “kids” are already 
eligible, or soon will be eligible, to exercise the rights of adulthood 
such as the right to vote, serve in the military, or marry.241  
Accordingly, student religious and political expression, while often 
less sophisticated than that of adults, is nevertheless important in 
                                                          
 232. Id. at 677–78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 233. Id. at 676. 
 234. Id. at 676–77 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 512–13, 514 (1969)) (alterations in original). 
 235. Id. at 677. 
 236. Id. at 678, 679. 
 237. Id. at 679. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 680. 
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helping students learn how to formulate and express their own 
opinions as well as respond to the opinions of other students with 
which they disagree.242  As Judge Rovner correctly noted, student 
expression of religiously-based disapproval of homosexual behavior 
cannot be reflexively labeled as harassment or hate speech that 
schools may censor in the name of tolerance.243 
2. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified 
School District244 provides schools with broad leeway to restrict student 
speech and has been the subject of much criticism and debate.245  
Harper involved a school’s decision to forbid a sophomore student 
from wearing a t-shirt that stated “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL 
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on the front and 
“HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” on the back.246  He wore the 
shirt in response to “Day of Silence” activities at the school that 
promoted tolerance of students with a different sexual orientation.247  
One year earlier, there had been some altercations at the school 
during a “Day of Silence” and a subsequent “Straight-Pride Day,”248 
although it was unclear whether those events had any real 
relationship to the case at hand.249 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the school’s decision to ban the shirt by a two-to-one vote in a 
broad-ranging decision that, if followed, would allow schools to 
censor virtually any student t-shirt that expresses opposition to 
homosexuality.250  The majority opinion, authored by Judge 
Reinhardt, declared:  “Perhaps our dissenting colleague believes that 
                                                          
 242. But see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (noting 
that although students “do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
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 246. Id. at 1171. 
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one can condemn homosexuality without condemning homosexuals.  
If so, he is wrong.  To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say, 
necessarily, that gays and lesbians are shameful.”251  The majority 
opinion used many strong terms for its view of the t-shirt’s message 
such as “condemning,”252 “demeaning,”253 “injurious,”254 a “verbal 
assault[],”255 a “psychological attack[],”256 “derogatory,”257 
“degrad[ing],”258 “harmful,”259 “hateful,”260 “homophobic,”261 
“discriminatory,”262 and “offensive.”263 
The court took a broad view of Tinker’s statement that public 
schools may restrict student speech that “‘intrudes upon . . . the 
rights of other students’ or ‘collides with the rights of other students 
to be secure and to be let alone.’”264  The court stated: 
Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt “collides with the rights of other 
students” in the most fundamental way.  Public school students who 
may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying 
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a 
right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses.  As 
Tinker clearly states, students have the right to “be secure and to be 
let alone.”  Being secure involves not only freedom from physical 
assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young people to 
question their self-worth and their rightful place in society.265 
The court held that schools “may prohibit the wearing of T-shirts 
on high school campuses and in high school classes that flaunt 
demeaning slogans, phrases or aphorisms relating to a core 
characteristic of particularly vulnerable students [such as race, 
religion, and sexual orientation] and that may cause them significant 
injury.”266  The court drew a comparison between Harper’s t-shirt and 
“labeling black students inferior” or “wearing T-shirts saying that Jews 
                                                          
 251. Id. at 1181. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1175 n.11, 1177, 1178, 1182, 1187 & n.34. 
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503, 508 (1969)). 
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are doomed to Hell” and stated that, “[i]f a school permitted its 
students to wear shirts reading, ‘Negroes: Go Back To Africa,’ no one 
would doubt that the message would be harmful to young black 
students.”267 
The court stated that, in pursuit of their educational mission, 
“public schools may permit, and even encourage, discussions of 
tolerance, equality and democracy without being required to provide 
equal time for student or other speech espousing intolerance, bigotry 
or hatred.”268  For example, a school “need not permit its students to 
wear T-shirts reading, ’Jews Are Christ-Killers’ or ‘All Muslims Are Evil 
Doers’” if it holds a “Day of Religious Tolerance,” nor must it allow 
swastikas or Confederate flags in response to a “Day of Racial 
Tolerance.”269 
The panel tried to limit the scope of its decision, stating, “we 
reaffirm the importance of preserving student speech about 
controversial issues generally and protecting the bedrock principle 
that students ‘may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved.’”270  For example, the majority 
stated that t-shirts that declare “Young Republicans Suck” or “Young 
Democrats Suck” or that “denigrate the President, his administration, 
or his policies, or otherwise invite political disagreement or debate, 
including debates over the war in Iraq, would not fall within the 
‘rights of others’ Tinker prong.”271 
Judge Kozinski’s dissenting opinion stated that “[r]econciling 
Tinker and Fraser is no easy task,”272 but declared that “the school 
authorities have offered no lawful justification for banning Harper’s 
T-shirt.”273  The dissent noted that there was scant evidence showing 
any actual or likely disruption caused by Harper’s t-shirt—he wore a 
similar shirt on the previous day and there was no disruption274—and 
stated that the vague references to altercations that occurred a year 
earlier bore little, if any, connection to the case at hand.275  The 
dissent noted that “discussions [between high school students] can 
become heated, but so long as they don’t escalate into violence or the 
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threat of violence, and do not otherwise interfere with school 
operations, they cause no disruption of the school environment.”276 
In addition, the dissent took issue with the idea that a school could 
deem the promotion of one side of a contentious debate to be part of 
its educational mission and then declare student expression with an 
opposing viewpoint to be inconsistent with the educational process.277  
Moreover, the dissent acknowledged that 
tolerance toward homosexuality and homosexual conduct is 
anathema to those who believe that intimate relations among 
people of the same sex are immoral or sinful. . . .  [A] visible and 
highly publicized political action by those on one side of the issue 
will provoke those on the other side to express a different point of 
view, if only to avoid the implication that they agree.278 
Regarding the “rights of others” language from Tinker, the dissent 
stated, “[s]urely, this language is not meant to give state legislatures 
the power to define the First Amendment rights of students out of 
existence by giving others the right not to hear that speech.”279  
Instead, “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can only refer to 
traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion 
of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First 
Amendment is well established.”280  The dissent also rejected the 
majority’s conclusion that “messages such as Harper’s are so offensive 
and demeaning that they interfere with the ability of homosexual 
students to partake of the educational environment.”281 
The dissent questioned the scope of the majority’s unprecedented 
reading of the “rights of others” language, calling it a “judicial 
creation, hatched to deal with the situation before us, but likely to 
cause innumerable problems in the future.”282  It stated that 
if interference with the learning process is the keystone to the new 
right, how come it’s limited to those characteristics that are 
associated with minority status?  Students may well have their self-
esteem bruised by being demeaned for being white or Christian, or 
having bad acne or weight problems, or being poor or stupid or 
any one of the infinite number of characteristics that will not 
                                                          
 276. Id. at 1194. 
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qualify them for minority status.  Under the rule the majority 
announces today, schools would be able to ban t-shirts with pictures 
of Mohammed wearing a bomb turban but not those with pictures 
of a Crucifix dipped in urine—yet Muslim and Christian children, 
respectively, may have their learning equally disrupted.283  
The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc which led to 
three strongly-worded concurring and dissenting opinions.284  Judge 
Reinhardt defended his panel opinion by stating, “[t]he dissenters 
still don’t get the message—or Tinker!  Advising a young high school 
or grade school student while he is in class that he and other gays and 
lesbians are shameful, and that God disapproves of him, is not simply 
‘unpleasant and offensive.’  It strikes at the very core of the young 
student’s dignity and self-worth.”285  Judge Reinhardt claimed that the 
dissenters’ view would leave school officials powerless to prevent 
students from wearing t-shirts with slogans such as “Hitler Had the 
Right Idea . . . Let’s Finish the Job!” or “Hide Your Sisters—The 
Blacks Are Coming” unless and until “minority members chose to 
fight back physically and disrupt the school’s normal educational 
process.”286  In a short concurring opinion, Judge Gould wrote a short 
concurring opinion that stated that schools may restrict “[h]ate 
speech, whether in the form of a burning cross, or in the form of a 
call for genocide, or in the form of a tee shirt misusing biblical text to 
hold gay students to scorn.”287 
Judge O’Scannlain, joined by four other judges, dissented from the 
denial of rehearing en banc.288  Judge O’Scannlain stated that “Judge 
Kozinski’s powerful dissent explains why the court errs in permitting 
school administrators to engage in view-point discrimination on the 
basis of a student’s newly promulgated right to be free from certain 
offensive speech.”289  The dissenters observed that “Harper’s shirt was 
undoubtedly unpleasant and offensive to some students, but Tinker 
does not permit school administrators to ban speech on the basis of 
‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.’”290  The dissenters added that “if 
displaying a distasteful opinion on a T-shirt qualifies as a 
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2006) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
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psychological or verbal assault, school administrators have virtually 
unfettered discretion to ban any student speech they deem offensive 
or intolerant.”291 
In the dissenters’ view, “the panel majority’s decision amounts to 
approval of blatant viewpoint discrimination” because “[s]chool 
administrators permitted the ‘Day of Silence’ but prohibited Harper 
from offering a different view.”292  The dissent stated that “under the 
panel majority’s decision, school administrators are now free to give 
one side of debatable public questions a free pass while muzzling 
voices raised in opposition.”293  Judge O’Scannlain noted Eugene 
Volokh’s observation that the panel majority’s opinion is “a tool for 
suppression of one side of public debates (about same-sex marriage, 
about Islam, quite likely about illegal immigration, and more) while 
the other side remains constitutionally protected and even 
encouraged by the government.”294 
While Harper’s claims for injunctive relief were ultimately 
dismissed due to mootness,295 this does not negate Harper’s value as 
persuasive authority.296  The Ninth Circuit’s reliance upon the “rights 
of others” dicta from Tinker has drawn heavy criticism, and one 
author has stated that “the Ninth Circuit became the first court in the 
thirty-seven years since Tinker to base its decision solely on the 
invasion of others’ rights test without applying the substantial 
disruption test.”297  Even authors who support the outcome in Harper 
have criticized the court’s reliance upon Tinker’s “rights of others” 
dicta and have argued that the court should have used traditional 
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“substantial disruption” analysis.298  One author supportive of the 
result has explained that “the Ninth Circuit created a completely new 
legal framework” in Harper which “essentially created a blank check 
for schools to regulate student speech, at least when that speech is 
anti-homosexual.”299  In addition, under Harper, 
most anti-homosexual speech in schools is subject to regulation 
because of its harmful psychological impact on any homosexual 
student attending the school.  Student speech that inflicts similar 
psychological harm on any other individual or specific group is also 
potentially subject to regulation under [Harper’s] application of the 
invasion of others’ rights test.300 
One scholar has posited that, using the “rights of others” test, 
school officials should be permitted to “restrict student speech 
reasonably viewed as being offensive to a reasonable student,” which 
would allow them to “protect[] the delicate psyche of the youth.”301  
The justification for this more speech-restrictive standard is that 
“requiring a history of disturbance before speech can be restricted 
provides no recourse for school administrators dealing with first-time 
derogatory speech that can cause immediate, and perhaps 
irreparable, psychological harm.”302  Under this formulation, the 
message “Be Happy, Not Gay” is acceptable because it “cannot 
reasonably be viewed as injurious or derogatory to a reasonable 
student,”303 while the message at issue in Harper can be prohibited 
because of the “overt hostility evident in the message.”304  This, 
however, shows the inherent malleability of any standard that allows 
schools to censor expression due to their perceptions of the alleged 
psychological impact of a controversial message.  Under Harper, 
virtually any message that proclaims the virtue of one religion or 
denounces homosexual behavior could be interpreted as a 
psychological attack on other students because, in Judge Reinhardt’s 
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view, “one can[not] condemn homosexuality without condemning 
homosexuals.”305 
Given Tinker’s clear protection of controversial student speech, it is 
unsurprising that “some critics have called the revival of the ‘rights of 
others’ requirement ‘a significant restriction on the First Amendment 
rights . . . that were unambiguously guaranteed by Tinker almost forty 
years ago.’”306  One author has noted that “Harper extends so far 
beyond Tinker’s limits on student free speech rights that it ultimately 
contradicts the authority and rationale upon which Tinker rests.”307  
“[E]ven political speech that touches on a student’s ‘core identifying 
characteristics such as race, religion, or sexual orientation’ should 
enjoy the same constitutional protection during the school day that it 
would in public”308 because “educating high school students to 
exercise and endure liberty is more important to a public high 
school’s fundamental mission than ensuring equality or comfort.”309  
These commentators have properly identified the conflict between 
Tinker’s broad protection of controversial student speech and Harper’s 
authorization of censorship of student speech that may offend other 
students.310  
It is clear that widespread adoption of Harper’s “rights of others” 
analysis would have a broad chilling effect upon student religious 
expression that could conceivably offend other students.311  The 
Harper test “easily could prohibit religious speech from a wide variety 
of political, social, and religious viewpoints. . . . [D]epending on how 
the ‘rights of others’ concept is defined, Tinker’s second test could 
have a very broad effect.”312  In addition, “restricting student speech 
under Tinker’s ill-defined second test could be notably easier for 
schools than restricting the same speech under the material and 
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substantial disruption test, especially because religious beliefs often 
are central to an individual’s identity and thus a particularly sensitive 
subject.”313 
One author asked, “Would a message promoting the traditional 
heterosexual two-parent household be as suspect as Harper’s?  Is it 
entirely irrelevant that Harper responded to school-approved 
messages?  Do Harper’s intentions matter, especially if our focus is on 
listener harm?”314  Under Harper, schools could argue that censorship 
of speech that supports traditional marriage or heterosexual two-
parent homes is justified by a concern for the psychological well-
being of other students.  While such expression would rarely, if ever, 
create a risk of substantial disruption for purposes of traditional 
Tinker analysis, Harper gives schools a green light to censor such 
expression under the guise of promoting respect for other students.  
This would severely hamper students’ ability to express their 
viewpoints on controversial political, social, religious, and moral 
issues and, as a result, would diminish their education and their 
preparation to become well-informed citizens.315  Harper squarely 
conflicts with Tinker and should be criticized or distinguished by 
courts considering student speech cases whenever possible. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts considering whether to follow Harper’s lead should keep in 
mind Judge O’Scannlain’s observation that “Tinker does not permit 
school administrators to ban speech on the basis of ‘a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint’”316 and that, “if displaying a distasteful opinion 
on a T-shirt qualifies as a psychological or verbal assault, school 
administrators have virtually unfettered discretion to ban any student 
speech they deem offensive or intolerant.”317  Instead, “[i]n the school 
context, free speech rights should be as broad as possible so long as 
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the school can still maintain discipline and its basic educational 
purpose.”318 
The First Amendment’s broad protection of non-disruptive student 
speech certainly extends to “controversial” religious, pro-life, or 
political student expression.319  As the district court observed in 
Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. School Board,320 
the issue of equal rights for citizens who are homosexual is 
presently a topic of fervent discussion and debate within the courts, 
Congress, and the legislatures of the States, including Florida.  The 
nation’s high school students, some of whom are of voting age, 
should not be foreclosed from that national dialogue. . . . . 
 The robust exchange of political ideas is essential in a vibrant, 
progressive society and is precisely the type of speech that is 
sacrosanct under the First Amendment.321 
When public high school administrators and teachers are 
confronted with “controversial” religious, pro-life, or political student 
expression that may contradict their viewpoints, philosophies, or 
educational goals, they must keep in mind that there is no legitimate 
educational function “that they may not perform within the limits of 
the Bill of Rights.”322 
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